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Abstract
Transparency is often deemed critical to enable
effective real-world deployment of intelligent sys-
tems. Yet the motivations for and benefits of dif-
ferent types of transparency can vary significantly
depending on context, and objective measurement
criteria are difficult to identify. We provide a
brief survey, suggesting challenges and related
concerns. We highlight and review settings where
transparency may cause harm, discussing con-
nections across privacy, multi-agent game theory,
economics, fairness and trust.
1. Introduction
The case for transparency has been made in many settings,
including for government policy (Vishwanath and Kauf-
mann, 2001), business (Lowenstein, 1996), charity (Sridhar
and Batniji, 2008), and algorithms (Mortier et al., 2014).
Within machine learning, there is a general feeling that
“transparency” – like “fairness” – is important and good.
Yet both concepts are somewhat ambiguous, and can mean
different things to different people in different contexts.
We discuss various types of transparency in the context of
human interpretation of algorithms, noting their benefits,
motivations and difficulties for measurement.
We then consider settings where, perhaps surprisingly, trans-
parency may lead to a worse outcome. Transparency is often
beneficial but it is not a universal good. We draw attention to
work in other disciplines and hope to contribute to an explo-
ration of which types of transparency are helpful to whom
in which contexts, while recognizing when conditions may
arise such that transparency could be unhelpful.
We summarize our main themes:
(A) There are many types of transparency with different
motivations – we need better ways to measure them (§2).
(B) We should recognize that sometimes transparency is a
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means to an end, not a goal in itself (§2 and §3.3).
(C) Actors with misaligned interests can abuse transparency
as a manipulation channel, or inappropriately use informa-
tion gained (§3).
(D) In some settings, more transparency can lead to less
efficiency (§4 reviews economics, multi-agent game theory
and network routing), fairness (§5) and trust (§3.2 and §6).
In §7, we raise ‘machine interpretability’ as an important
research direction, which may also provide insight into how
to measure human understanding in some settings.
Related Work There is a considerable literature on trans-
parency and social good. Much of this focuses on the bene-
fits of transparency but some earlier work, notably in eco-
nomics and social science, also considers drawbacks of
transparency and accountability (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999;
Prat, 2005; Etzioni, 2010; Peled, 2011; Bernstein, 2014).
We discuss related work throughout the text.
2. Types of Transparency: Benefits,
Measurement and Motivations
In this section, we briefly describe various types of trans-
parency in the context of human interpretability of algo-
rithmic systems, highlighting different possible motivations.
We typically seek an explanation in understandable terms,
which can often be framed as answering questions of “what”,
“how”, or “why” (either toward what purpose in the future,
or due to what cause in the past). Some of our observations
have been made previously (Lipton, 2016; Doshi-Velez and
Kim, 2017; McAllister et al., 2017). To our knowledge,
in the machine learning setting, we make new points on
motivations and on measuring understanding.
An automated explanation might arise immediately from
the original system – typically if it has been constrained
to lie in some set of classifiers deemed to be interpretable
(e.g. a short decision list). Alternatively, a second explainer
algorithm may have produced an explanation for the original
system. We consider various classes of people: a developer
is building the system; a deployer owns it and releases it to
the public or some user group; a user is a typical user of
the system. For example, developers might be hired to build
a personalized recommendation system to buy products,
which Amazon then deploys, to be used by a typical member
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Challenges for Transparency
of the public. People might be experts or not.
We list several types and goals of transparency. Each may
require a different sort of explanation, requiring different
measures of efficacy:
1. For a developer, to understand how their system is work-
ing, aiming to debug or improve it: to see what is work-
ing well or badly, and get a sense for why.
2. For a user, to provide a sense for what the system is
doing and why, to enable prediction of what it might do
in unforeseen circumstances and build a sense of trust in
the technology.
3. For society broadly to understand and become comfort-
able with the strengths and limitations of the system,
overcoming a reasonable fear of the unknown.
4. For a user to understand why one particular prediction or
decision was reached, to allow a check that the system
worked appropriately and to enable meaningful challenge
(e.g. credit approval or criminal sentencing).
5. To provide an expert (perhaps a regulator) the ability to
audit a prediction or decision trail in detail, particularly
if something goes wrong (e.g. a crash by an autonomous
car). This may require storing key data streams and
tracing through each logical step, and will facilitate as-
signment of accountability and legal liability.
6. To facilitate monitoring and testing for safety standards.
7. To make a user (the audience) feel comfortable with a
prediction or decision so that they keep using the system.
Beneficiary: deployer.
8. To lead a user (the audience) into some action or behavior
– e.g. Amazon might recommend a product, providing an
explanation in order that you will then click through to
make a purchase. Beneficiary: deployer.
We can differentiate between the intended audience of an
explanation and the likely beneficiary (or beneficiaries). We
suggest that types 1-6 are broadly beneficial for society
provided that explanations given are faithful, in the sense
that they accurately convey a true understanding without
hiding important details. This notion of faithful can be
hard to characterize precisely. It is similar in spirit to the
instructions sometimes given in courts to tell “the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth”.
Defining criteria and tests for practical faithfulness are im-
portant open problems. We suggest that helpful progress
may be made in future by focusing on one particular context
at a time. We make a similar suggestion for the challenges of
characterizing if an explanation is good at conveying faith-
ful information in understandable form, and if a human has
Figure 1. An image (left) is given to a classification system. A sepa-
rate explaining algorithm extracts the sub-image (right) which it es-
timates led the original system to output “beagle” (from Dabkowski
and Gal, 2017). Would it be better or not if the sub-image con-
tained the legs of the dog? That depends on the classification
system and is not simple to answer, demonstrating one challenge
in defining a quantitative measure of the quality of the explanation.
actually understood it well.1 Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017)
suggest several methods, such as establishing a quantitative
approximate measure (e.g. if we are restricting models to be
decision trees then we can feel reasonably confident that a
model becomes harder to understand as the number of nodes
increases), or asking a human if they can correctly estimate
what the system would output for given inputs. We suggest
further approaches below and highlight a key challenge.
We use (as in Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017) the terms global
interpretability or explanation for a general understanding
of how an overall system works, as in our transparency
types 2-3; and local interpretability for an explanation of a
particular prediction or decision, as in types 4, 5, 7 and 8
(though both forms may be useful for a given type).
For global interpretability, we mention two interesting pos-
sible approaches due to quotes attributed to the physicist
Richard Feynman: (i) “What I cannot create, I do not un-
derstand” suggests that in some settings, a good test of
understanding might be to see if the person could recreate
the whole system (given expert help and allowing some rea-
sonable tolerance); (ii) “If you can’t explain it to a six year
old, you don’t really understand it” suggests a possible meta-
approach to test clarity of an explanation – for any given test
T of human understanding, ask the person to explain the
system to someone new, then give that new person the test
T . Lakkaraju et al. (2016) introduced measures of human
interpretability based on being able to describe a decision
boundary, which would facilitate model reconstruction. We
discuss further notions of understanding in §7.
Highlighting a key challenge even for local interpretability,
consider explaining the output of an image classification sys-
tem, as illustrated in Figure 1. Recent approaches attempt
to identify the parts of a given image which are most salient,
1Greater faithfulness of an explanation may challenge the abil-
ity of its audience to understand it well, perhaps requiring a greater
investment of time and effort (Ribeiro et al., 2016).
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i.e. those parts which in a sense were most responsible for
leading to the system’s prediction (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Zint-
graf et al., 2017). Such approaches can be very helpful – e.g.
for type 1 transparency, we might learn that a system which
reliably tells apart wolves from huskies on a test set might
in fact be relying on the presence or absence of snow in the
background, rather than features of the animal itself, and
hence is unlikely to generalize well on test data (Ribeiro
et al., 2016). Suppose we are given two such methods of
generating a salient sub-image for a classification system.
How should we measure which method provides a better ex-
planation of what the system is doing? This is an important
open question. Note that it is not helpful to compare against
what a human thinks is relevant in the image. Rather, we
want a sub-image which is high in predictive information for
the system yet is not too large, focusing only on the relevant
region. A promising possible direction for a quantitative
solution was suggested by Dabkowski and Gal (2017), who
propose a measure of concentration of information.
Transparency as a Proxy Transparency can provide in-
sight into other characteristics which may be hard to mea-
sure (as noted by Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017). In the previ-
ous paragraph, we saw how local explanations for an image
classification system – revealing how wolves were differen-
tiated from huskies – demonstrated the lack of robustness of
the system. Other features where transparency can provide
helpful insight include fairness, verification and causality.
3. Possible Dangers of Transparency
In this section, we begin to examine ways that transparency
may be unhelpful.
3.1. Divergence between Audience and Beneficiary
There are some forms of transparency, such as types 7 and
8 in §2, where the intended audience for an explanation
diverges from the beneficiary, hence the motivation may be
suspect. This can lead to worrying types of manipulation
and requires careful consideration.
Considering type 7 transparency, we draw attention to the
remarkable ‘Copy Machine’ study. Langer et al. (1978)
arranged for researchers to try to jump in line to make a few
photocopies at a busy library copy machine. The researcher
either (i) gave no explanation, asking simply “May I use
the xerox machine?”; (ii) provided an ‘empty’ explanation:
“May I use the xerox machine, because I have to make
copies?”; or (iii) provided a ‘real’ explanation: “May I use
the xerox machine, because I’m in a rush?” The respective
success rates were: (i) 60%; (ii) 93%; and (iii) 94%. The
startling conclusion was that saying “because something”
seemed to work very effectively to attain compliance, even
if the ‘something’ had zero information content. Hence, a
possible worry is that a deployer might provide an empty
explanation as a psychological tool to soothe users.
In fact there is a line of research which considers all commu-
nication often to be more a form of manipulation than a way
to transfer information. This view is prominent when tak-
ing an evolutionary view of multiple agents (Wiley, 1983),
a perspective which we revisit throughout the remainder
of this paper. Earlier work by Adelberg (1979) explored
whether disclosures provided in financial reports are more
aptly described as communication or manipulation.
For type 8 transparency, where the deployer has a clear mo-
tive which may not be in the best interests of the audience
of the explanation, particular care and future study is war-
ranted. Even if a faithful explanation is given, it may have
been carefully selected from a large set of possible faithful
explanations in order to serve the deployer’s goals.
3.2. Government Use of Algorithms
In many states in the US, a private company provides the
COMPAS system to judges to help predict the recidivism
risk of a prisoner, i.e. the chance that the prisoner will
commit a crime again if released. This information is an
important factor in parole hearings to determine whether
to release prisoners early or to keep them locked behind
bars. Significant attention has focused on whether or not the
prediction system is fair (Angwin et al., 2016). We discuss
connections between fairness and transparency in §5. Here
we consider the appropriate degree of transparency of such
a system: a prisoner should at least have transparency type
4 from §2, but can there be too much transparency?
Perhaps motivated by concerns in the US over the COMPAS
system, Bulgaria recently passed legislation requiring that
(many forms of) government software be open source, “after
all, it’s paid by tax-payers’ money and they should... be
able to see it” (Coldewey, 2016). Note that a machine
learning system typically consists of both algorithms and
data, and having access to just one of these may not provide
much meaningful information. We consider the case of all
algorithms and data being transparently available and note
several concerns.
Gaming and IP Incentives If all details are readily avail-
able, this can facilitate gaming of the rules (Ghani, 2016).
In addition, if all code and data is open source, then this
removes incentives to develop relevant private intellectual
property, which may delay progress significantly.
Transparency and Privacy Indeed, in many cases, trans-
parency may be viewed as the opposite of privacy. Many in
society feel that some sort of right to privacy – and hence,
a limit to transparency – is appropriate. This can create
tensions even for one user whose data is used in a system
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– the user may want their personal data to be kept private
but might also like a right to an explanation of how that
same system (algorithms + data) works. Further, there are
many settings where privacy (i.e. a lack of transparency to
all) is critical to foster a trusting relationship of confidence.
Examples include the relationship between a doctor and a
patient, a lawyer and their client, or discussions of interna-
tional diplomacy. Inside these relationships, it is interesting
to question whether greater transparency leads to trust. We
return to this topic in §6. Here we rather suggest that a
prudent approach is to release private information only to a
partner that is already trusted, hence trust can lead to trans-
parency. Providing information to an agent empowers them
(Solove, 2001), hence you should first be confident that their
interests align with yours.
As one example, there has been discussion about the extent
to which government agencies such as the NSA should be
allowed to collect data on individuals. Some argue that
“if you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to fear”
(Solove, 2011) or suggest that collecting only ‘metadata’ is
harmless. Yet Cole (2014) quotes General Michael Hayden,
former director of the NSA and CIA, as saying “We kill
people based on metadata.”
3.3. Means and Goals
In §2, we noted that transparency can serve as an imper-
fect proxy to gain insight into other desirable properties
of a system, such as reliability or fairness. For example,
transparency is often cited as critical for deployment of
autonomous vehicles. We suggest that these transparency
concerns are primarily for types 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. Each of
these involves somewhat different types of explanation or
understanding, with some easier to implement than others.
A key concern is reliable safety: how can we be certain that
the vehicle will perform well in all circumstances if we do
not understand exactly how it is working?
In such cases, we should take care not to stifle innovation
by confusing transparency as an end in itself rather than
a means to other goals. It is conceivable that much time
and resources could be spent trying to gain an extremely
transparent understanding, when those efforts might be bet-
ter spent directly on the goal of improving safety. Being
pragmatic, it is plausible that society will resort to imple-
menting various safety tests, such as are used for aircraft
autopilot systems. If such tests are passed by an autonomous
vehicle system, and accidents are extremely rare in practice,
then it may make sense to proceed even without full trans-
parency. After all, which is preferable: full transparency
and many deaths per year from accidents, or much less trans-
parency and far fewer deaths per year? As Einstein (1942)
eloquently put it, we must beware the “perfection of means
and confusion of goals”.
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Figure 2. An example of Braess’ paradox for network flow from
(Kelly, 1991). 6 cars of flow must pass from s to t. For each edge:
red (above) shows the cost (i.e. delay incurred) as a function of
the flow x through it; blue (below) shows the Wardrop equilibrium
flow given the costs, based on each car selfishly optimizing. When
the edge u→ v is added, surprisingly everyone does worse.
4. Economics & Multi-agent Game Theory
In an economy, each individual acts as an autonomous agent.
If each agent optimizes her own selfish utility, there is no
guarantee in general that this will lead to the best outcome
for society. Under restrictive assumptions, Arrow and De-
breu (1954) famously proved the existence of a general
equilibrium for a competitive economy. If externalities are
present, i.e. if costs of one agent’s actions fall on others,
then we should expect that the result of each agent optimiz-
ing her own outcome may lead to a suboptimal result for
the whole. This phenomenon is sometimes described as the
price of anarchy (Roughgarden, 2006).
We relate this to transparency by considering what happens
if all agents are given additional faithful information about
a system. This kind of transparency is closest to type 3
from §2, which may seem the most innocuous of all. An
engineering perspective might naturally lead one to suspect
that more information should lead to a better outcome. How-
ever, the background of an economist or multi-agent game
theorist helps to realize that more information empowers the
agents to optimize their own agendas more efficiently, and
thus may lead to a worse global outcome. We illustrate these
ideas with a striking example of Braess’ paradox (Braess,
1968) as given by Kelly (1991).
Figure 2 (top) shows a traffic network where 6 cars enter s
at the left, flow through the network via either u or v and
exit from t at the right. The costs (delays) of each edge are
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shown in red, and importantly rise as the amount of flow
through them increases. This is realistic in that greater traffic
flow on a road often leads to longer delays for everyone on it.
Thus we have externalities. If each agent optimizes her own
utility, the Wardrop equilibrium shown in blue is reached,
where each car incurs a delay of 10 · 3 + 3 + 50 = 83
time units (details in Kelly, 1991; at a Wardrop equilibrium,
no individual can reduce her path cost by switching routes,
hence all routes have the same cost).
Now consider what happens if all cars learn about an extra
road from u to v as shown in Figure 2 (bottom). We may
assume that the u → v road was always there but that it
was hidden until the faithful information about its existence
was made transparent. Although intuitively the additional
road increases capacity for all and hence should only lead
to a better outcome, in fact the new Wardrop equilibrium
obtained by selfish optimization results in a greater delay
for everyone of 10 · 4 + 2 + 50 = 92 units!
Kelly (1991) provides an additional twist on this example.
Suppose now that all users know that road works might be
under way on the u→ v road, which has delay x+ 10+R,
where R is a random variable taking the values 0 or 30 with
equal probability. If R is unknown, then the expected delay
along u → v is x + 25, leading to the outcome in Figure
2 (top) with delay of 83. On the other hand, if instead R
is known to everyone, then: we either have R = 30 which
leads to the outcome in Figure 2 (top); or we have R = 0
which leads to the outcome in Figure 2 (bottom); for an
expected delay of 12 (83 + 92) = 87.5 > 83. Hence, again
transparency (providing everyone with faithful information)
leads to a worse expected outcome for everyone.
5. Fairness and Discrimination
Much work on fairness in machine learning has focused
on attempting to avoid discrimination against sub-groups
as identified by sensitive features, such as race or gender.
Typical metrics for discrimination are based on various types
of disparate impact or disparate treatment (Barocas and
Selbst, 2016). Here we consider a theme which relates to a
common fairness approach used to avoid disparate treatment:
simply remove the sensitive feature(s) from the data. A valid
objection to this method is that it may be possible to predict
(and hence reconstruct) the sensitive feature(s) from other
features with high confidence. Nevertheless, the approach
is in widespread use and the example below may help to
explain its intuitive appeal to some.
Axelrod (2006) describes fascinating work exploring the
conditions under which cooperation naturally emerges in
multi-agent populations. In many settings, repeated con-
tact leading to iterated prisoner’s dilemma interactions are
supportive of the emergence of cooperation (for details of
Figure 3. Illustrations by Hammond and Axelrod (2006) of the
evolution of ethnocentrism. 4 different tribes are shown as shades
of gray. Agents which are {Ethnocentric (cooperate with their
own tribe, defect against other tribes) / Pure cooperators (always
cooperate) / Egoists (always defect) / Those who cooperate only
with other tribes} have {Horizontal / Vertical / Diagonal up-right /
Diagonal up-left} lines respectively. The left image shows one run
after 100 periods; the right image is after 2000 periods. Over time,
almost all agents are ethnocentric. See the reference for a video.
the prisoner’s dilemma, see https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Prisoners_dilemma).
In subsequent work, Hammond and Axelrod (2006) ex-
panded the framework to consider agents which have an
extra feature of ‘ethnicity’ which might be regarded as their
color or tribe. Now each agent could either cooperate or
defect when interacting with other agents of the same tribe;
and similarly could either cooperate or defect with agents
of other tribes. Using a simple model of multi-agent evolu-
tion, it was strikingly demonstrated that a robust conclusion
across a wide range of model parameters, is that ‘ethnocen-
trism’ emerges. That is, after many iterations, each agent is
very likely to cooperate with others of the same tribe, but to
defect against agents from other tribes. See Figure 3.
Hence, in this setting, greater transparency (i.e. making
faithful information on ethnicity available) leads to the emer-
gence of discriminatory behavior.
Recent work explores multi-agent reinforcement learning in
repeated social interactions to begin to identify conditions
on the environment and the agents’ cognitive capacities
which lead to the emergence of cooperation (see Leibo et al.,
2017; Lowe et al., 2017 and related blog entries).
6. Trust: Transparency and Honesty
Many support the view that transparency builds trust. For
example, the Dalai Lama is reported to have warned “A
lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense
of insecurity.” However, we suggest that the story is more
nuanced. If we distinguish between transparency – i.e. the
provision of information – and honesty – i.e. the accuracy
of the information – then which is more important?
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A common view is that trust relies on honesty. The fol-
lowing quote is attributed to Simon Sinek: “Trust is built
on telling the truth, not telling people what they want to
hear.” However, as we can sense from the following phrases
themselves, it can be difficult to hear the ‘harsh truth’ from
someone speaking with ‘brutal honesty’.
In recent work, Levine and Schweitzer (2015) demonstrated
settings where prosocial lies increased trust. Prosocial lies
are a form of deception – the transmission of information
that intentionally misleads others – which benefits the target.
Their work aims to separate the roles of benevolence and
integrity in building interpersonal trust. They conclude
that altruistic lies increase trust when deception is directly
experienced, or even when it is merely observed.
These effects may make sense when we consider that hu-
mans evolved in a tribal multi-agent society. Trusting some-
one may reflect a belief that they are ‘in our tribe’ and will
look out for our interests. From a historic survival perspec-
tive, this benevolence may have been more important than
truthful communication – perhaps a ‘pre-truth’ society?
Interestingly, work in psychology indicates that we are not
good at estimating how transparent we our ourselves when
communicating with others. Gilovich et al. (1998) showed
evidence for the illusion of transparency – a tendency for
people to overestimate the extent to which others can discern
their internal states. This is attributed to a tendency for
people to adjust insufficiently from the ‘anchor’ of their own
experience when attempting to adopt another’s perspective.
Consistent with this, Griffin and Ross (1991) observed the
following result. If someone is asked to tap a well-known
melody on a tabletop and then to estimate the chance that a
listener will be able to identify the song they have tapped,
tappers grossly overestimate the listener’s abilities.
7. Machine Interpretability & Understanding
The focus of this workshop is on human interpretability, that
is helping humans to understand machines. But two classes
of ‘machine interpretability’, that is helping machines to
understand, are also important lines for future research.
First, it will be increasingly helpful for machines to be
able to understand humans and our motivations. As ex-
amples, consider automated care for the elderly, or how
an autonomous vehicle waiting at a crossroad should per-
ceive and respond reliably if a human in a car opposite is
beckoning to advance.
Second, we believe that a fruitful line of work will be to
help machines understand each other. Exciting work has
begun to explore this direction, looking for ways to enable
multiple agents to cooperate effectively (Evtimova et al.,
2017; Mordatch and Abbeel, 2017). Different paradigms of
multi-agent organization should be explored (Horling and
Lesser, 2004). One motivation is the goal of AI agents which
can autonomously generate flexible, hierarchical concepts
which can apply broadly, going beyond traditional transfer
learning. Ideally, these concepts will capture high level
structure in a way which can be communicated efficiently
and deployed flexibly. Although it is highly desirable for
humans to understand this structure, we suggest that it will
still be extremely useful, and perhaps easier, to begin by
working on ways for machines to communicate with each
other. Further, complex structures may be developed which
are beyond easy human understanding.
It is possible that a relatively low capacity information bot-
tleneck (as examined by Tishby et al., 1999) will be a useful
constraint between agents to develop such structures. Indeed
it has been suggested that the low inter-human bandwidth
of speech compared to the higher processing power of our
brains may have helped lead to the development of our own
intelligence and consciousness (Lawrence, 2017).
With this goal in mind, a useful metric of successful ‘transfer
of understanding’ (in this sense, a metric for a good expla-
nation) could be to measure how agent B’s performance on
some task, or range of tasks, improves after receiving some
limited information from agent A – though important details
will need to be determined, including suitable bandwidth
constraints, and recognition that what is useful will depend
on the knowledge that A has already.
A similar notion might be useful for measuring human inter-
pretability. An example of a helpful conceptual explanation
to improve a beginner’s ability to play chess might be “try to
control the center”. One advantage is that only performance
improvement need be measured, bypassing the difficult task
of quantifying internal understanding directly.
8. Conclusion
There are many settings where transparency is helpful. We
have described some of these settings and tried to begin to
clarify just what sort of transparency may be desirable for
each, with accompanying research challenges. This topic
is timely given keen interest in laws such as the GDPR
(enforceable in the EU from 2018) which seek to provide
users with some sort of right to an explanation of algorithmic
decisions.
One focus of this work is to highlight scenarios where trans-
parency may cause harm. We have provided examples where
greater transparency can lead to worse outcomes and less
fairness. We hope to continue to develop frameworks to un-
derstand what sorts of transparency are helpful or harmful
to whom in particular contexts. This is a rich area which can
draw on connections across economics, multi-agent game
theory, law, policy and cognitive science.
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